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Place, or lived-space, is currently a topic of much interest in continental philosophy and the philosophy of the social sciences. In perusing this literature, one is struck by the attention afforded to the question of the “objectivity” of space, a concern that is largely absent in the more austere treatments of physical space within the analytic tradition. In particular, many researchers of place attempt to shed light on the relationship between our human, subjective, and practical experience of space and the epistemological/ontological notion of objectivity.​[1]​ Nevertheless, these studies have largely failed to address two important, and somewhat obvious, interrelated problems associated with the objectivity of space: 
Problem (1): Can a theory of place successfully counter any radically relativist (or subjectivist) interpretation of the epistemology and ontology of space? As employed in this context, a “radical spatial relativist” rejects any objective or invariant spatial structure, and thus the geometric structure of space is entirely relative to different persons, cultures, or practices—example: space is Euclidean relative to geometer A, and space is non-Euclidean relative to geometer B, although both inhabit the same world.

Problem (2): How does the subjective or social aspect of the experience of space connect or interface with the underlying ontology of the physical world? 

In an attempt to answer these questions, this essay will explore the actual, tacit, or potential utilization of the concept of objectivity (subjectivity, intersubjectivity) within the lived-space movement. One of the main goals of our investigation, therefore, will be to determine if there is a successful formulation of these notions that can resolve problems (1) and (2), yet is both amenable to place theorists as well as consistent with the details of physical space as gained through the sciences. While section 2 will reveal some of the contemporary place theorists’ unsuccessful attempts to deal with problems (1) and (2), section 3 will disclose that the place school has been historically reluctant to embrace geometrical or mathematical concepts as a means of elucidating the objectivity of place. A brief synopsis of the historical development of the place theory, with special emphasis placed on the legacy of the phenomenologists, Husserl and Heidegger, for the burgeoning place approach, will greatly assist our analysis by indicating the various philosophical assumptions that continue to undermine the relevance of mathematics for the lived-space movement—assumptions that, as will be demonstrated, are largely responsible for the relativism worries that remain within the place theory of space to this day. In contrast to the line of thought that runs from the later Husserl to the place theorists, however, section 4 will demonstrate that providing a fundamental role to mathematical concepts in the analysis of place need not undercut the integrity of the lived-space approach. Rather, mathematics can prove an invaluable resource in understanding how the personal or social experience of space is correlated with the spatial experience of other persons and groups, and, since mathematics also reveals the invariant structure of physical space, can provide a method for resolving problems (1) and (2).

2. Radical Spatial Relativism and the Place Theory.
In the more practice-oriented disciplines and philosophical schools of the late-twentieth century, considerable attention has been devoted to the concept of “place”; which, put roughly, denotes the study of space (spatiality) as manifest within a human, usually social, order or practice (as in, dwelling, abode, local). The place theory of space relies on the insights gathered from a host of twentieth century philosophers and philosophical movements traditionally categorized as non-analytic: for the philosophers, e.g., Husserl, Heidegger, Deleuze, and for the philosophical movements, e.g., phenomenology, environmental studies, literary theory, social geography. Overall, the place school downplays many of the themes prominent in the more mathematical and physics-based analytic examinations of space (such as the absolute/relational controversy, or the metric conventionalist interpretations of spacetime geometry). 
The relevance of space to the vexed subjective/objective problem assumes an obvious importance in the lived-space field, moreover: a subjective space is “a space that is tied to some feature of the creature’s own awareness or experience . . . —the space of awareness within which it acts and with respect to which its actions are oriented and located” (Malpas 1999, 50). Objective space, conversely, “is a grasp of space that, while it requires a grasp of one’s own perspective and location, is a grasp of space that is not centered on any particular such perspective or on any particular location . . . “ (66). Yet, apart from a few instances (as will be detailed below), most of the investigations of place do not address adequately the exact structure or relationship between place and its objective and subjective components. If, indeed, any trend can de detected in this field, it would seem that many authors favor an interpretation of place that posits subjective space as primary, with objective space being derived, or “stitched together”, from subjective experience. The subjective space of bodily/social experience is thus held to be an irreducible element in the construction of our concept of objective space—an approach that would likely be seen as the reverse of the common or intuitive belief in the primacy of the objective spatial order (such that the subjective component of spatial phenomena is seen as a consequence of this objective structure). In a popular text, Edward Casey seems to endorse this reduction, viewing the objective, infinite, mathematical “space” of the Modern era as derived from the earlier, human-centered concept of bodily and social “place”: “In a dramatic reversal of previous priorities, space is being reassimilated into place, . . . as a result of this reversal, spacing not only eventuates in placing but is seen to require it to begin with” (Casey 1997, 340; original emphasis). Later on, commenting favorably on the work of social theorist Jean-Luc Nancy, he proclaims, “spaces comes from places, not the other way around” (341). Among other examples of a possible subjectivist leaning, one can cite various difficult passages in Tuan’s (1977) environmental study, where a person’s experience “constructs a reality” (8), and Entrikin’s (1991) appeal to “narrative” to connect the subjective and objective aspects of place (132-134), since “narrative” has strong subjectivist overtones.      
Unfortunately, this subjectivist philosophical stance appears woefully incapable of countering any radically relativist conception of space (place), our problem (1) above: that is, if the construction of the objective spatial order is dependent upon our subjective, local experiences/practices, as they claim, then there is a need for some form of limitation, or set of constraints, on the acceptable methods of explicating or conceiving the global, objective structure of space (place). If not, a radically incommensurable set of competing objective spatial structures is the inevitable and unfortunate outcome. One need only recall, for instance, the flat-earth worldview of ancient civilizations to realize how quickly this incommensurability of competing subjective interpretations can arise. These societies often interpreted the world as both flat and centered upon their home civilization—two “hypotheses” apparently confirmed through simple bodily experience and common social practice. Consequently, the subjectivist interpretation of space would seem to lack the conceptual resources needed to defuse the full-incommensurability problem: Was the earth “really” flat for ancient Middle-Eastern civilizations (e.g., the Genesis creation story in the Bible), but “really” spherical for modern Western societies? It is tempting to claim that modern science provides the “true” explanation of space; but, of course, modern science is just another social practice or narrative. So, how do the place theorists extricate their methodology from the embarrassing subjectivity, or relativism, of space (place) that it seemingly embodies?   
Some place theorists appear to be aware of this problem, and strive to avoid the impending conflict of spatial schemes by means of constraints (as noted above) imposed either internally or externally to all potential subjectivist theories: either by openly endorsing the “irreducibility” of the objective aspect of spatial experience, or, more frequently, by acknowledging the intervention of an underlying physical space in the subjective act of spatial construction. One of the more notable efforts to address problem (1) appears in Malpas (1999), which also draws upon both of the above methods for undermining a radical subjectivism. First, Malpas persistently rejects the view that objective space can be derived “from a mere concatenation of subjective spaces” (61; Campbell 1994, 5-37, also rejects a reductive subjectivism for similar reasons). By claiming that the two are “correlative concepts” (Malpas 1999, 36), or have a “complex interconnection” (70), the suggestion would seem to be that the irreducibly objective facet of spatial experience sets up barriers to a full-incommensurability concerning different subjective formulations of space (i.e., the proposed objective-subjective irreducibility prevents, say, the flat and spherical models of earth’s geometry from being equally successful social constructions). In Kantian fashion, the incommensurability is purportedly blocked because the subjective space presupposes the objective (and visa versa). Yet, this strategy seems consonant with a full-blown objectivism regarding space—and, of course, the intention was to develop a subjectivist theory that shuns objectivism. More precisely, if certain subjectivist-based theories of spatial geometry are automatically ruled out (flat-earth cases), and others allowed in (spherical-earth theories), this is tantamount to invoking objective facts about spatial geometry which are external to any particular social practice or construction of space. In addition, this form of response does not explain how the interrelated objectivity-subjectivity of place prevents incommensurable constructions of place, even granting its irreducibility. So, unless more details are forthcoming, problem (1) still stands, as does problem (2), of course.
Possibly in response to such worries, Malpas exploits our second form of constraint on the subjective constructions of space: namely, the ontology of the physical world. In a brief aside, he considers a sort of supervenience relationship between place and the underlying ontology, the latter identified as “physical space”.
In some sense place must ‘supervene’ upon physical space, and upon the physical world in general, such that the structure of a particular place will reflect, in part, the structure of the physical region in relation to which that place emerges. The relation between place and physical space will, however, be no less complicated, and no more amenable to a reductive analysis, than is the relation between the realm of our everyday talk about our world and physical theory. (34)

Presumably, Malpas intends the supervenience of place to be akin to, for instance, how our ordinary experience of the solidity or color of macroscopic objects ultimately emerges from a realm of entities (atoms, molecules) that do not possess those traits. Yet, this interesting hypothesis does not hold up under closer scrutiny. First, on the place theory, place contains an irreducibly subjective component of human experience, whereas many of the macroscopic properties of bodies, such as solidity, do not (or need not). That is, physical space does not by itself give rise to place in the way that subatomic particles alone are responsible for many of the macroscopic properties of bodies (unless, of course, humans and their experiences actually emerge from physical space, as it may for supersubstantivalists, or in Plato’s Timaeus). There are certain properties ascribed to bodies that rely on human experience in the irreducible manner suggested by Malpas, however, such as colors, sounds, smells, etc. But, each of these “sensory” properties are the by-products of specific sensory organs and their unique construction—so, following the analogy, where is the “place organ”, or the unique structure of one of our existing sensory organs, that is responsible for our irreducible experience of place? Overall, it is unclear how the alleged supervenience of place relates to the other forms of proposed supervenient relationships. Simply describing the concept of place as a supervenient property does little to explain how it actually emerges from physical space; thus, although problem (1) is supposedly solved, the vagaries of the supervenient place property are tantamount to problem (2).
In summary, the lived-space approach to space would appear to be susceptible to the following dilemma. If they embrace a robust social constructivism, such that space is a direct byproduct of human/social practices, then the lived-space approach entails a radical form of spatial relativism, problem (1). On the other hand, if the place theorists attempt to counter this problem by invoking either the underlying physical space or the objectivity of space (as in the supervenience and irreducibility hypotheses, respectively), then the place theory requires an explanation of the means by which the spatial practice is so constrained—and the lived-space theorists have not given a plausible account thus far. Appealing to either the underlying ontology or the objectivity of space poses other difficulties for the place theorists, moreover, since the “lived” aspect of space would seem dependent upon either the structure of physical space or the objectivity of space—and both of these non-subjective constructions are often given a mathematical formulation. As a result, these strategies of resolving the radical subjectivist quandary are not very popular among place theorists, likely due to the perception that it situates the human/social element of space in a decidedly inferior and subordinate status with respect to the more quantitative and mathematical, and less qualitative, aspects of space. What the place theorists would ideally desire, it would seem, is a solution to problem (1) that retains an essential subjective component, such that the individual’s spatial experience or the social practice is not entirely reduced to the physical ontology or a non-subjective conception of objectivity. 
Before discussing a potential method of meeting this challenge, in section 4, we will first explore the possible reasons for the lack of a mathematical conception of subjectivity and objectivity within the place school, a potential bias that may have prevented the lived-space theorists from actually developing a more successful interpretation of spatial objectivity. This bias can be traced, at least in part, to the early twentieth century phenomenologists, most notably, Heidegger and the later Husserl. Unlike recent treatments of place, which either ignore or quickly dismiss mathematics as relevant to the place theory, these early phenomenological tracts openly discussed the relationship between mathematics, especially geometry, and their new conception of a subjective, lived-space. Husserl, in particular, will comprise a major part of the remainder of our investigation, for the difficulties associated with Husserl’s theory of subjective space in his later work are identical to the problems just described for the contemporary practitioners of the lived-space theory, and hence Husserl’s more forthright analysis of the interrelationship of objectivity and mathematics will serve as an ideal basis for diagnosing the viability of contemporary place theory.      

3. The Place Theory and The Mathematics of Space.
3.1. Husserl and the Early Phenomenological influence. For some of the phenomenological investigations that inspired contemporary lived-space theorists, an implicit appeal to physical space as a form of external constraint may be in evidence, a tactic that is identical to the use of the underlying physical space by modern place theorists as detailed in section 2. In Husserl’s theory, since the phenomenal realm of the subject presupposes a physical body, a pre-existing “continuum of places” is postulated for the body’s occupation (see, Husserl 1981, 225). Likewise, Merleau-Ponty’s seemingly subjectivist-based interpretation of space relies on an underlying, “natural and primordial space”, which seems to function as a constraint on the formulation of any subjective space (1962, 290-294).​[2]​ As for Heidegger, the complexities of the relationship between human existence (roughly, Dasein) and spatiality are enormous (see, e.g., Vallega 2003), but a similar dependence on a pre-given world may be in evidence: “space is . . . ‘in’ the world in so far as space has been disclosed by that being-in-the-world which is constitutive of Dasein . . .” (1962, 146). If “being-in-the-world” is taken literally, space would thus seem to be a result of our human existence (Dasein) conjoined with the “world”. In short, space is a product of the pregiven world and human existence; which, once again, suggests a constraint imposed by the world on our subjective constructions of space. Yet, these early phenomenological theories of the human and social construction of space run afoul of the problem noted in the previous section; namely, that the supposedly non-reducible subjective element of spatial experience, or the spatial practice, has indeed been reduced (to the underlying physical ontology) in order to solve problem (1)—or, if the subjective component is claimed to be non-reducible, then the manner by which the underlying physical ontology interacts with, and thus constrains, the formation of lived-space is left a mystery.
A more intriguing puzzle that emerges in these early phenomenological works, however, concerns the status of mathematics, especially geometry, in its seemingly unavoidable mediating role between, on the one hand, physical space, and on the other, subjective lived-space. As previously noted, it will be useful to examine some of these works in closer detail, especially Husserl’s many contributions, for they not only influenced contemporary trends in social and continental thought, but they may also shed light on the current absence of a quantitative, mathematical methodology in the place theory’s treatment of objective space.   
The principle publication of Husserl’s middle period, Ideas I (1982), would profoundly influence a host of neo-Kantians, including the young Rudolf Carnap and Hermann Weyl, through his utilization of a sort of surrogate “synthetic a priori” epistemological process within a largely empiricist framework. In the concept of “essential seeing”, Husserl stipulated that a particular spatial experience of, say, an extended object (or an act of imagination; 1982, 11) could allow an immediate grasp of general or universal geometric knowledge, a “seeing the essence” of general geometric truths that transcends the specific geometric content contained in that particular experience. Despite the presence of this a priori factor, objective space and geometry in Husserl’s scheme are ultimately constructions or idealizations based on subjective experience, much like the earlier theories put forward by, among others, Helmholtz, Mach, Wilhelm Wundt, and Hermann Lotze.​[3]​ The geometry of our subjective experience is Euclidean, furthermore, whether in a single intuited act of spatial perception/imagination (as just described), or as one goes beyond these single acts to construct the larger space that results from the accumulation of spatial experience through bodily motion (and spatial variations in imagination).​[4]​
In his late period, a more relativist or subjectivist tone is supposedly struck in several of Husserl’s works on space and geometry, foremost being, The Crisis in European Sciences (1970), along with its associated appendices (“The Origin of Geometry”, in particular). These writings would prove a source of inspiration for the later place school, for they bring to the forefront several concepts central to the contemporary approach to place: principally, the “life-world”, and the “mathematization of nature”. The life-world, as defined in the Crisis, is “the spatiotemporal world of things as we experience them in our pre- and extra-scientific life” (1970, 138); and, focusing exclusively on the spatial aspect of the life-world, is comparable to the subjective lived-space of the place theorists, since it is conceived as our ordinary, non-scientific spatial awareness and practices. Husserl inquires into the historical origins of the objective, mathematical world of the physical sciences, trying to determine how it arises out of the pre-mathematical, subjective realm of individual experience. The primary historical example that Husserl offers in his description of this emerging mathematization of the world is Galileo’s mechanics of body and motion, which, not surprisingly, takes the form of Euclidean geometry. This process cannot capture the life-world in its entirety, however, for the mathematical idealizations and abstractions can only indirectly apply to the purely qualitative or sense-based aspects of the life-world (32-37). Furthermore, he refers to these geometrical ideals as “cultural acquisitions which arise out of human accomplishments” and as “tools” (26). In the life-world, he states that “the bodily shapes of rivers, mountains, buildings, etc., which as a rule lack strictly determining [geometric] concepts and names,” must first have their ideal shapes constructed so as to allow the “art of measurement” (27-28).
Nevertheless, Husserl does not question the objectivity of physical geometry, for he repeatedly rejects any historicist, relativist conception that would regard space and geometry as merely contingent constructs of a particular society, such that they do not hold true for all potential societies: “geometry, with all its truths, is valid with unconditioned generality for all men, all times, all peoples, and not merely for all historically factual ones but all conceivable ones” (377). Husserl is interested in the historical, social origins of geometry, no doubt, but as a “historical a priori”, where “as the expression ‘a priori’ indicates, it lays claim to a strictly unconditioned and truly apodictic self-evidence extending beyond all historical facticities” (373). In effect, Husserl’s social, historical investigation of geometry strives to reveal the “inner structure of meaning” across all individuals and societies (371), since the historical world is “historical only through the inner historicity of the individuals, who are individuals in their inner history, together with that of other communalized persons” (372, fn.)—that is, in order to claim that geometric truths have a timeless, unconditioned validity, Husserl grounds all geometric practices in an invariant human feature common to all individuals and societies. This invariant feature, which we will explore further in section 4, may be comparable to his earlier method of “essential seeing”, although the text is particularly vague on this point. Regardless of its origins, Husserl’s quasi-absolutist depiction of the objectivity of geometry would clearly preclude our problem (1), the incommensurability of contrary geometric schemes (although, as discussed above, Husserl’s earliest writings posit an underlying “continuum of places”, which may have served as a non-mathematical external constraint on incommensurable geometries). 
Returning to the topic of Husserl’s influence for the upcoming place theory, in particular, for the prospects of a mathematical conception of space, it was clearly not his notion of an objective scientific a priori that was to prove decisive, but probably his methodology of “bracketing off” the objective sciences in the search for the historical a priori of the life-world. The process of bracketing, also termed the  in the Crisis, is designed to isolate the objective sciences in order to ascertain the unique or principle characteristics of the life-world, which “must have their own ‘objectivity’, even if it is in a manner different from our [objective] sciences . . .” (133). This theme, that the proposed objective principles of the life-world may be “different” than the developed sciences of the day, persists throughout the Crisis: 
A certain idealizing accomplishment is what brings about the higher-level meaning-formation and ontic validity of the mathematical and every other objective a priori on the basis of the life-world a priori. Thus the latter ought first to become a subject of scientific investigation in its peculiarity and purity, and then one ought to set the systematic task of understanding how, on this basis and in what manners of new meaning-formation, the objective a priori comes about as a mediated theoretical accomplishment. What is needed, then, . . . [is] a division among the universal inquiries according to the way in which the “objective” a priori is grounded in the “subjective-relative” a priori of the life-world or how, for example, mathematical self-evidence has its source of meaning and source of legitimacy in the self-evidence of the life-world. (140)

By separating the different “a prioris” of the objective sciences and the life-world, the implication is that mathematics and geometry must be, or should be, confined to the objective a priori (i.e., due to the  of the objective sciences) in order to ascertain the true nature of the life-world. Not surprisingly, ensuing generations of place theorists would almost certainly interpret Husserl’s late research as advocating a complete and total ban on the use of mathematical techniques in their study of the “subjective-relative” sphere of human spatial practices. In fact, with respect to space, Husserl is quite clear that geometric content is not “internal” to the life-world, and thus apparently not open to an analysis that employs mathematical techniques (despite the fact that geometric truths can be formed as idealized abstractions from the life-world):
Prescientifically, the world is already a spatiotemporal world: to be sure, in regard to this spatiotemporality there is no question of ideal mathematical points, of “pure” straight lines or planes, no question at all of mathematically infinitesimal continuity or of the “exactness” belonging to the sense of the geometrical a priori. The bodies familiar to us in the life-world are actual bodies, but not bodies in the sense of physics. The same thing is true of causality and of spatiotemporal infinity. (139-140)

In other words, the life-world has its own kind of space, a space which is radically different from the space utilized in mathematical physics, i.e., physical geometry.
Turning briefly to some of the other early sources of the lived-space movement, Merleau-Ponty, in Phenomenology of Perception, likewise follows Husserl’s Crisis in viewing geometric space as derived from the lived-space of human experience and practices, although he locates the source more explicitly in bodily motion: e.g., he states, “bodily space can really become a fragment of objective space only if within its individuality as bodily space it contains the dialectical ferment to transform it into universal space” (102); and that “the subject of geometry is a motor subject [of the human body]” (387). More interestingly, Merleau-Ponty also claims that “natural and primordial space [i.e., the physical space that underlies subjective, lived-space] is not geometrical space” (294).​[5]​ 
Finally, Heidegger’s Being and Time also expounds a subjectivist-based hypothesis of space, yet his skeptical critique of the concept of objectivity arguably influenced the place school in a more profound and radical fashion. Despite a general similarity of content between Heidegger’s and Husserl’s theories—Heidegger’s “Dasein” and the “Mathematical Projection of Nature” functioning somewhat analogously to Husserl’s life-world and mathematization of nature—the type of a priori science of the life-world championed in Husserl’s later work would seem quite incompatible with Heidegger’s finite, historical understanding of Dasein (human existence). As previously discussed (and will be investigated further in section 4), Husserl envisions an objective a priori structure underlying the life-world itself, such that this essential structure can secure, and thus explain, the intersubjective agreement among different historical cultures and periods (as well as provide the foundation for the objective a priori of the sciences). Yet, given Heidegger’s general inclination towards the Lebensphilosophie of, e.g., Dilthey and Simmel (albeit with strong reservations), this a priori process would appear to subvert the primacy of Dasein in favor of a non-subjective, timeless idealization. In Being and Time, Heidegger refers to “the manifold questionableness of the phenomenon of ‘validity’, which since Lotze has been fondly passed off as a not further reducible ‘basic phenomenon’”, and he proceeds to outline various meanings of “validity”: “as manner of being of the ideal, as objectivity, and as bindingness [for all people]” (1927, 155-156). Therefore, any attempt to locate an invariant structure underlying all human spatial practices would likely draw the Heideggerian charge of invoking timeless “essences”; or, Husserl’s project errs by trying to explicate our social engagements in the world, the “ready-to-hand”, by means of the “present-to-hand”, which are the theoretical idealizations derived from those practices—but this turns Heidegger’s philosophy exactly on its head, for the defining trait of Dasein is its “being-in-the-world” (existence), not an idealized abstraction.​[6]​
3.2. Contemporary Social Trends. There are a number of themes in these major phenomenological tracts that, directly or indirectly, shaped the course of the place theory’s approach to space and mathematics: first and foremost is the primacy of subjective lived-space, which thus serves as the basis for deriving objective geometric space; second, that subjective space is essentially qualitative, and not quantitative, geometrical or mathematical; and third, as a direct result of the rise of mathematical physics in the Early Modern period, that objective geometrical space is Euclidean, infinite, and homogeneous. Accepting all three of these points does not necessarily lead to the incommensurability of different subjective spaces, our problem (1), as Husserl’s endorsement of the geometric a priori readily confirms. Nevertheless, since few lived-space theorists have been willing to embrace any kind of objectivist or mathematically-inspired philosophical foundations, as did Husserl, there seems little to prevent the incommensurability of subjective place from becoming the dominant or default view.
To demonstrate the mathematical aversion that is prevalent among many place theorists, one need only consult Casey’s influential history, The Fate of Place (1997), which is representative of much contemporary work on the topic of lived-space.
The ultimate reason for the apotheosis of space as sheerly extensional is that by the end of the seventeenth century place has been disempowered, deprived of its own dynamism. . . . Space itself, serenely void of place, retains dimensionality alone as an abiding structure of its own extensiveness. All one can do with dimensions of height, breadth and depth is to fill and measure them . . . . In this measuring game, by which Nature is mathematized down to its secondary qualities, place can figure only as a subdominant variation: as distance in regard to fixed reference points . . . . The grid of analytical geometry becomes the gridlock of physical space itself. . . . The triumph of space over place is the triumph of space in its endless extensiveness, its coordinated and dimensional spread-outness, over the intensive magnitude and qualitative multiplicity of concrete places. . . . Space on the modernist conception ends by failing to locate things or events in any sense other than that of pinpointing positions on a planiform geometric or cartographic grid. Place, on the other hand, situates, and it does so richly and diversely. It locates things in regions whose most complete expression is neither geometric nor cartographic. (200-201)

Presumably, the motivation for this line of thought is derived from many sources, but Husserl’s later work may have played a major role: prior to quoting from the Crisis (where Husserl declares that in the life-world “we find nothing of geometrical idealities, no geometrical space or mathematical time with all their shapes”; 1970, 50), Casey explains that “the organic body singled out by Husserl opens onto the ‘primary world’ that is not amenable to direct mathematization” (223). Furthermore, in Casey’s chronological survey, Husserl is one of the first philosophers examined who supposedly favors a view, like Casey’s, concerning the (alleged) non-mathematical essence of subjective place (life-world).  
While these extracts help to corroborate the central importance of Husserl as a precursor to the burgeoning lived-space movement, at least with respect to the three tendencies listed above, other passages make a more explicit link with a Heideggerian brand of subjectivism, such that mathematics, logic and language are relative, at least in part, to culture or practice (i.e., place): 
Treatments of logic and language are still more place-blind [in the twentieth century], as if speaking and thinking were wholly unaffected by the locality in which they occur. On the eve of World War I, Russell and Whitehead composed Principia Mathematica, which explored the universal logical foundations of pure mathematics with unmistakable allusion to Newton’s Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica. (xii)

Casey’s discussion also discloses a feature frequently encountered in the place movement’s theorizing about space, specifically, the tendency to link an objective, mathematical conception of space with various forms of social and political totalitarianism or exploitation: “Is it accidental that the obsession with space as something infinite and ubiquitous coincided with the spread of Christianity, a religion with universalist aspirations” (xii)? In Casey’s defense, some exponents of subjective space go much further, as in the case of Henri Lefebvre, who categorizes “abstract” space, which is geometric, with a “phallic” attribute that “symbolizes force, male fertility, masculine violence” (1991, 287). While such claims are quite disturbing in their own right, what is equally troubling in these texts is the woeful treatment of the historical development of the concept of subjective space. Casey’s treatise, which claims to be a history of place, discusses neither the rise of the empirical, body-centered approach to geometry and space that began with Helmholtz and Mach (among others)​[7]​, nor the Lebensphilosophie movement that drew encouragement from these nineteenth century mathematical developments (with the Lebensphilosophie school, e.g., Dilthey, Scheler, and Simmel, serving in turn as the starting point for Heidegger). For many of the place theorists, there is a (postmodern/continental) tendency to interpret modern, or post-Kantian, philosophy as having began with the later Husserl and Heidegger, hence contributing to an impoverished conception of the significance of mathematics in the evolution of the subjective space idea. That a long “dry spell” came between the German Idealists and the phenomenologists is evident in Casey’s book: “Starting with Kant and continuing in Husserl and Whitehead [of his later Process and Reality, 1929, in particular] and Merleau-Ponty, place is considered with regard to living organisms and, in particular, the lived human body” (332)—which suggests that nothing of importance for the development of subjective spatial theories occurred between Kant and Husserl!

4. Towards a Mathematical Conception of Subjective Space.
As outlined in sections 1 and 2, an interpretation of spatial objectivity that, in some fashion, includes a subjective component might possibly provide a means of combating the incommensurability dilemma, problem (1), while simultaneously upholding the subjective experience of the individual, culture, or practice. Despite being largely ignored by contemporary place theorists, late nineteenth century mathematicians actually developed many techniques that can be seen as offering just this kind of strategy.
4.1. Geometry and the Subjective. The lived-space theorists are fond of characterizing geometrical space as the flat, lifeless plain of Euclidean geometry (as the above quotes by Casey indicate), but the nineteenth century witnessed an explosion of diverse geometric theories and constructions that undermines this simplistic assumption. For our purposes, two of the most important innovations concern the analytic method of geometric construction and the investigation of the intrinsic structure of manifolds (differential geometry), which originated in the pioneering work of Gauss and Riemann, in particular. A Euclidean understanding of geometrical objects, such as “point” or “line”, was no longer necessary given the new analytic method, since these objects could now be defined purely by means of algebraic equations (i.e., since algebraic equations are essentially neutral and uninterpreted as regards their geometric meaning, they do not uniquely favor a Euclidean interpretation). The analytic approach allowed, in turn, the creation of a new geometric method, differential geometry, that could furnish a characterization of surfaces in terms of their intrinsic, as opposed to extrinsic, curvature (where “intrinsic” curvature is determined from a perspective confined entirely to that surface, and “extrinsic” pertains to its determination from outside the surface). In short, curvature could now be characterized intrinsically for each point on a surface (or, more precisely, for the infinitesimal neighborhood surrounding each point on a manifold) without requiring a larger, Euclidean space in which to embed the surface. The intrinsic geometry of a surface can be regarded, in fact, as its geometry as determined by geometers confined to that surface using (idealized mathematical) measuring procedures (e.g., comparing vectors between neighboring points, etc.). This new mathematical outlook ultimately helped to fuel speculation in “higher” dimensional spaces in numerous popular books and articles in the decades both before and after the turn of the century; that is, these authors tried to depict how hypothetical beings in different dimensional worlds (while confined to their space) would measure space from their perspective: e.g., Abbott’s Flatland (1884), or the many books by C. H. Hinton. Consequently, by conceiving geometric structures from a local, surface-bound basis, there is a tacit affinity between the intrinsic methodology of differential geometry and the theory of lived-space. Not only do they both reject the necessity of a background Euclidean framework in order to determine the geometric features of their proposed spaces, but they also approach spatial structures from the local level of surface inhabitants and their measuring processes.
A second point of comparison between the place theory and the geometric techniques invented in the nineteenth century can be found in the latter’s utilization of coordinate frames, the transformations rules that link these frames, and the invariants preserved among these translations; a branch of differential geometry known as tensor analysis (and which is intimately connected with the intrinsic geometric method just described). The kinship with the place theory’s idea of subjective space is immediately apparent in tensor analysis, since this branch of mathematics can be roughly characterized as the study of “what remains the same” (invariant) under different spatial perspectives (frames)—thereby demonstrating, in a fashion, how the objective features of geometry emerge from the subjective. On the Euclidean plane, distance is an invariant feature, such that the distance between any two given points is measured to be the same regardless from which position, or coordinate point, one measures it: if  and , then the distance between these points is , which will be an identical numerical value from all perspectives. The transformations on the plane (the space  of ordered pairs of real numbers) that leave distance invariant includes all rotations, , and translations, , such that: , for the vector . This distance (metric) function can be generalized to incorporate different coordinate systems (Cartesian, Spherical, etc.) and different geometries (Euclidean, Spherical non-Euclidean, etc.) as given in the well-known formula for the line element,  (for Riemannian and semi-Riemannian spaces). Overall, the group of allowable transformations on a space specify the type of geometry—consequently, the same space (say, ) can allow different groups of transformations, and thus different invariants, and thus different geometries. That is, some perspectives in  will reveal an invariant quantity that other frames will not uphold. Only a limited number of transformations among frames will preserve the invariants of Euclidean geometry (length and angle), for example, whereas a wider class of transformations will preserve the ratios along parallel lines (affine geometry).​[8]​ Unlike the monotonous, uniform geometry caricatured by the place theorists, the picture that differential geometry presents is quite complex and varied, with a host of different geometrical structures and invariants all residing in the very same space. More importantly, differential geometry constructs these invariants from the subjective perspective of diverse coordinate positions or frames (and the transformations among frames), thereby revealing an indispensable, or non-reducible, contributing role for a subjective (i.e., perspectival and non-global) component of space and geometry in securing the objective invariants. 
Finally, this methodology resolves both problems (1) and (2) in a more consistent and plausible manner than the (non-mathematical) lived-space approach can supply. The incommensurability of subjective space, problem (1), is resolved since many subjective perspectives (frames) in a space are not incorporated within any particular group of transformations: that is, the long sought after “constraint” on possible spatial constructions is a direct consequence of the type of transformation group and its corresponding invariant, which thus accounts for the absence of incommensurable geometries (i.e., it explains why there is only a determinate number and order of interrelated, non-incommensurable geometries). Likewise, the fixed interrelationship between the invariants of the geometry and the group of transformations also resolves our problem (2). The geometrical invariants are often regarded as representing the objective features of the underlying spatial ontology, although these features can only be accessed through the subjective-bound group of transformations. In short, the groups of transformations among frames secure the needed constraints, and constraints indicate, or correspond to, the world’s “real” structure.       
Needless to say, this grasp of the importance of the new geometrical techniques has escaped the notice of most place theorists, despite the fact that a subjective-based interpretation of space has remained their elusive quarry. Some early twentieth-century philosophers and physicists, on the other hand, did see the relevance of these mathematical developments for bridging the objective-subjective divide, most notably, the brand of structuralism exhibited in the theories of Weyl, Eddington, and Cassirer. Since the spacetime of the General Theory of Relativity is built upon a tensor calculus framework, it naturally led to a new appraisal of the subjective/objective relationship, as the following comments by Weyl indicate:  “[The] objective world is of necessity relative [subjective]; it can be represented by definite things (numbers or other symbols) only after a system of coordinates has been arbitrarily carried over into the world” (Weyl 1949, 116). This objective-subjective interrelationship, moreover, “contains one of the most fundamental epistemological insights which can be gleaned from science”, since “whoever desires the absolute must take the subjectivity and egocentricity into the bargain” (116). In a similar vein, Eddington emphasizes “the subjectivity of the universe described in physical science” (1958, 85). It is worth quoting Eddington’s argument at length:
“The subjectivity referred to . . . is that which arises from the sensory and intellectual equipment of the observer. Without varying this equipment, he can vary in position, velocity and acceleration. Such variations will produce subjective changes in the appearance of the universe to him; in particular the changes depending on his velocity and acceleration are more subtle than was realized in classical [Newtonian] theory. Relativity theory allows us to remove (if we wish) the subjective effects of these personal characteristics of the observer; but it does not remove the subjective effects of generic characteristic common to all “good” observers [the allowable transformations] . . . . The nearest we can get to a non-subjective, but nevertheless observational, view is to have before us the reports of all possible . . . observers, and pass in our minds so rapidly from one to another that we identify ourselves, as it were, with all the [possible] observers at once. . . . [The mathematician] has invented a transformation process which enables us to pass very quickly from one [possible] observer’s account to another’s. The knowledge is expressed in terms of tensors which have a fixed system of interlocking assigned to them; so that when one tensor is altered all the other tensors are altered, each in a determinate way. By assigning each physical quantity to an appropriate class of tensor, we can arrange that, when one quantity is changed to correspond to the change from [possible] observer A to [possible] observer B, all the other quantities change automatically and correctly. . . . A tensor may be said to symbolize absolute knowledge; but that is because it stands for the subjective knowledge of all possible subjects at once. (85-87)

Eddington, like the lived-space theorists, also cautions against envisaging the universe from a subject-less, “view from nowhere”, which the place theorists equate with lifeless, Euclidean space: “There does not seem to be much difficulty in conceiving the universe as a three-dimensional structure viewed from no particular position”, but he notes that “it is perhaps rather unfortunate that it is, or seems to be, so easy to conceive; because the conception is liable to be mischievous from the observational point of view” (86)—that is, it is mischievous as judged from the new subjective-based conception of physics provided by Relativity Theory and its formal presentation utilizing tensor calculus.
4.2. The Problem of Quantifying the Qualitative. The lived-space theorists may nevertheless reject any application of mathematics, such as the one outlined above, on the grounds that the essentially qualitative nature of subjective space—the “intensive magnitude and qualitative multiplicity of concrete places”, quoting Casey—is just not amenable to mathematical analysis. Eddington’s conclusion draws upon a distinction between the “personal versus the generic” understanding of subjectivity, so it might be claimed that subjective space is really the personal (which Eddington denies as relevant for the new physics). Unfortunately, interpreting a practice-based (or praxis) theory of space as akin to personal experience is quite problematic, for the manner by which space, as a social practice, acquires this individual, “personal” trait is left unexplained—and, it may contradict the very idea of a social practice, which must rise above the experience of individual practitioners in some fashion. Accordingly, if the place theorists deny the applicability of mathematics, then it must be based on a facet of their theory that, put roughly, resides at the social, non-personal level. 
Yet, for any level of investigation, even the social, trying to do without a mathematical or quantitative element is a difficult task indeed, and inevitably yields incommensurability anxieties. Husserl’s Crisis provides a clear example of this dilemma, for he denies that the life-world a priori is geometrical (see section 3.1) while simultaneously rejecting an incommensurability of conflicting life-world schemes (which is essentially his version of problem (1), although at the level of the life-world). His attempted solution is to “set up a goal of a truth about the objects which is unconditionally valid for all subjects, beginning with that on which normal Europeans, normal Hindus, Chinese, etc., agree in spite of all relativity—beginning, that is, with what makes objects of the life-world, common to all, identifiable for them and for us (even though conceptions may differ), such as spatial shape, motion, sense-quality, and all the like—then we are on the way to objective science” (1970, 139). After bracketing off the objective sciences, but prior to claiming that the life-world a priori is non-geometric, he contends that such relativist worries disappear “as soon as we consider that the life-world does have, in all its relative features, a general structure” (139). Moreover, “this general structure, to which everything that exists relatively is bound, is not itself relative”, and is such that “we can attend to it in its generality and, with sufficient care, fix it once and for all in a way equally accessible to all” (139). Finally, “as life-world the world has, even prior to science, the ‘same’ structure that the objective sciences presuppose” and “are the same structures that they presuppose as a priori structures and systematically unfold in a priori sciences” (original emphasis throughout, 139).
Deprived of mathematics, however, it is not exactly clear what Husserl has in mind in declaring that the life-world and the objective sciences share the “same” structure. Given the , mathematics has been bracketed away from the life-world a priori, so the similarity of structure cannot be mathematical/geometrical structure—yet, what “structure” remains? It is possible that Husserl has in mind a basic similarity between the scientific a priori’s mathematical structures, on the one hand, and the relational structure of the mental content associated with kinesthetic awareness (of the life-world a priori), on the other; where “kinesthetic” refers to the experience of one’s body in moving or resting, “each being an ‘I move’, ‘I do’ [etc.]” which “are bound together in a comprehensive unity” (106). Nevertheless, a relational similarity of this sort would seem to warrant an analysis employing some form of deeper mathematical structure (such as set theory or topology?), since one of the relata is, in fact, the mathematics of the natural sciences. But, any non-life-world idealization, like set theory, is apparently ruled out by the , which thereby calls into question, once again, Husserl’s “same structure” defense against relativism, or, the incommensurability problem (1). That is, the more abstract structures related to “analysis” (“theory of manifolds”, logic, etc.) are also idealizations ultimately derived from the life-world (43-48). Another tactic might be to simply assert that this similar structure is a metaphysical primitive or unanalyzable notion, a maneuver that Heidegger may have exploited in his later works.​[9]​ Alas, recourse to metaphysical expedients of this type would seem incompatible with Husserl’s claims for the scientific status of the life-world a priori, nor does a primitive metaphysical concept really explain how the impending relativism has been averted. 
On the whole, a purely metaphysical means of overcoming the incommensurability quandary leaves the relationship between the subjective aspect of space and the underlying ontology a mystery, our problem (2), as was first disclosed in the presentation of Malpas’ hypotheses. The place theorists have likewise failed to provide a plausible case for the exclusion of mathematics from the investigation of lived-space. Husserl’s philosophy in the Crisis, a notable precursor to these place theories, demonstrates the inherent vulnerability of any position that seeks objective scientific status for a subjective/practice oriented conception of space while simultaneously bracketing away mathematical methods. Conversely, an early model for how to integrate modern mathematical techniques might possibly be found in the work of the child psychologist Jean Piaget, who explored the conceptual or practical view of space in children using many of the geometrical structures outlined above: e.g., topological, projective, and Euclidean (Piaget 1967; incidentally, Piaget’s studies made a great impression on Merleau-Ponty, despite his many critical reservations, see, Moran 2000, 400). While not a theory of lived-space per se, Piaget’s analysis is very close to one, and other researchers have suggested an extension of these geometrically-informed hypotheses to the larger social realm (see, Sack 1980, 169).​[10]​ For example, the spatial constructions of different cultures could be tied to different geometrical invariants (as examined in section 4.1). Since these invariants, and their associated geometries, are nested within one another in a natural and determinate way, the diversity of geometrical practices does not entail, therefore, the incommensurability problem (1). Moreover, since the geometric invariants are normally construed as providing a link to, or a representation of, the underlying physical ontology— via the invariant relationships among frames and their associated constraints on possible frames—problem (2) is also resolved.​[11]​

5. Conclusion: A Famous Application of Mathematics within the Place Theory. 
The case presented thus far can be briefly summarized: by unfairly purging mathematical/geometrical concepts, the practice-oriented philosophers of place have unwittingly deprived their theory of a useful means of answering both the relativism problem (1), as well as the problematic relationship between the subjective experience of space and the underlying physical ontology, our problem (2). 
Not all place theorists have ignored mathematics, however. Therefore, by way of conclusion, we will examine what is probably the most famous (or infamous) instance of the application of mathematics within the theory of lived-space. In A Thousand Plateaus, Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari invoke a plethora of modern geometrical concepts in their exposition of “smooth” space and “striated” space, which, more or less, corresponds to subjective and objective space respectively.​[12]​ On the whole, Deleuze and Guattari make some interesting claims that are relevant to the potential utilization of mathematics within the place theory. Smooth space, in various passages, is described as non-metrical, local, and “is therefore a vector, a direction and not a dimension or metric determination” (1987, 478); whereas striated space is characterized as metrical. Deleuze and Guattari cite Riemann’s theory of manifolds as a model for viewing smooth space; and, although their analysis is rather incongruous mathematically, one of the goals seems to be a sketch of the relationship between the subjective, qualitative space of the individual (smooth space) and the formal, objective space (striated space, which they link with, not surprisingly, Euclidean space; 371). Their main contention is that smooth space, as the environs of the individual, need not be conceived as part of a larger metrical, striated space. They introduce Riemann’s theory to demonstrate that a point of the manifold (smooth space) can be connected to an adjacent point in a number of ways, such that a metrical connection need not be assumed, a process they call “accumulation” (485): e.g., while the infinitesimal neighborhood (or tangent space) of each point is Euclidean, vectors located at separate points can be compared in such a way that their (locally defined) Euclidean properties are lost in the transfer. Consequently, Deleuze and Guattari have relied upon the intrinsic approach to geometry and its concept of a manifold (as outlined in section 4.1) to correlate separate subjective spaces; albeit without really laying to rest the relativism issue (since the many possible connections among infinitesimal neighborhoods raises problem (1) in a new guise).​[13]​ 
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^1	  Throughout this essay, we will refer to objectivity as a joint epistemological and ontological notion, since lived-space theorists tend to blur the distinction between the two; see, Rescher (1997), on the many forms of objectivity, including ontological. Furthermore, “subjective” as used in this essay will refer to either a personal or social conception of space; i.e., as a non-objective conception. Finally, references to “place”, or “lived-space”, theory and theorists signify the contemporary, largely continental or continental-influenced, approach to space (e.g., Casey, Malpas, Lefebvre, etc.); it is not meant to denote the views of the early phenomenologists, in particular, Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty—although the methodology employed by these thinkers strongly foreshadows the modern lived-space movement, at least in some of their works (e.g., Husserl’s later philosophy in the Crisis).
^2	  In Merleau-Ponty’s analysis, incidentally, our Problem (1) is openly discussed in great detail, although his version describes the difficulty as a potential solipsism that may ensue from a subjective-based theory of space (i.e., each subjective space becomes it own independent spatial world), instead of as an incommensurability of different subjective schemes. Not all of the influential phenomenologically-based explorations of lived-space explore our problems (1) and (2), needless to say: e.g., Bachelard (1964), which foreshadows the modern place school—thus, it will not form a part of our investigation.    
^3	  Husserl is known to have studied Lotze’s theories of space and geometry in his early years; see, Mohanty (1995, 51). On empiricist theories of space and geometry, see, Torretti (1983), especially chapters 3 and 4. These empirical theories of space and physical geometry differ on many important details, of course, although many retain a synthetic a priori component, such as Helmholtz. Later, the neo-Kantians would draw inspiration from this work in their attempts to amend Kant’s “form of intuition” of space to allow the new non-Euclidean geometries employed in the General Theory of Relativity: e.g., Cassirer, and the early neo-Kantian motivated works of Schlick, Reichenbach, and Carnap. See, M. Friedman (1999), (2000), and T. Ryckman (2005), on Husserl’s influence for various neo-Kantian formulations of General Relativity.  
^4	  Husserl’s first extended treatment of these issues is in his early unpublished lectures, Thing and Space (1997), which also incorporates a conception of the visual and tactile fields such that the structure of places within these perceptual fields are invariant (in synthetic a priori fashion). In addition, it is worth noting that Husserl’s student, Oskar Becker, strived to remove the apparent contingency associated with objective Euclidean space, i.e., that Husserl’s theory of objective space allow for the possibility of different experienced geometrical structures. Influenced by Weyl’s work (and Husserl, of course), Becker relies on a mathematical (group-theoretic) argument to prove that our subjective experience of moving freely through space (via the Helmholtz-Lie theorem), in conjunction with our ability to distinguish rotations and translations, singles out Euclidean geometry as the only candidate for objective space. Weyl’s own theory also employs a group-theoretic approach, but only preserves a Euclidean structure infinitesimally for each point of the spacetime manifold, while repudiating a Euclidean global structure for physical space (as mandated by the variably curved spacetime of General Relativity; see, Mancosu and Ryckman 2005, and section 4). Finally, Becker’s own student, Elizabeth Ströker, would develop a theory like Becker’s in her (1987) text, a work that is often cited approvingly by contemporary place theorists.  
^5	  Merleau-Ponty does reject the type of geometric a priori favored by Husserl, however, for he claims that “‘Real’, i.e., perceived, triangles, do not necessarily have, for all eternity, angles the sum of which equals two right angles, if it is true that the space in which we live is no less amenable to non-Euclidean than to Euclidean geometry” (1962, 391). This estimate of the “underdetermination” of physical geometry is potentially misleading, however, for it seems to imply that any geometry is straightforwardly consistent (“no less amenable”) with the physical evidence. Rather, specific physical assumptions are required in order to render a particular geometry consistent with empirical data, and these assumptions can be challenged in numerous ways: e.g., given the evidence confirming the General Theory of Relativity, one needs to invoke peculiar universal forces so as to retain Euclidean geometry, and thus reject the much simpler non-Euclidean geometry actually employed by the theory. See, also Merleau-Ponty’s class notes (2003, 101-105), which appears to commit the same oversight.
^6	  In addition, Heidegger does not have a favorable opinion of the application of mathematical and logical techniques for resolving metaphysical problems. See, Friedman (2000), 13-23, which discusses the importance of the Davos lectures in 1929, presented by Heidegger and Cassirer, with Carnap present, for the development of Heidegger’s (quite hostile) attitude towards modern mathematical logic and mathematical physics. 
^7	  Body-centered, as used in this context, means the construal of physical geometry that is based on physical measurement, with its emphasis on the bodily experience of freely moving measuring devices in three dimensions to determine length, congruence, etc., known as “free mobility”.  
^8	  More carefully, The Euclidean transformations are a subgroup of the affine transformations, hence Euclidean geometry is a subgeometry of affine geometry (and both, in turn, are subgroups and subgeometries of the larger projective transformations and projective geometry). Also,  is the vector space of ordered pairs of real numbers allowing addition and scalar multiplication. Parts of this discussion are based on Brannan, Esplen, and Gray (1999), especially chapter 8 and appendix 2.
^9	  In an excellent survey, Joseph Kockelmans discusses the importance of the “aboriginal Event”, the Ereignes, which is “ontologically prior to Being as well as to time, because it is that which grants to both what they properly are” (1992, 162-163; this discussion is drawn from Heidegger’s Zur Sache Des Denkens, 1988). The relativism problem, for Heidegger, concerns Dasein’s finite understanding of Being, and the fact that different manifestations of Being’s history (epochs) cannot be philosophically derived according to some process or rule (since this would involve conceiving time as a collection of static “now” moments, which is a distortion). As Kockelmans describes it, a contemplative turning to the Ereignes can provide a unity to the multiplicity of epochs, and thus resolve the relativism worry, since “one understands, or perhaps more accurately stated, experiences that the various epochs are no longer mysteries, but are the necessary consequence of the inherent finitude of an aboriginal Event which presents the Open [the bestowing of past, present, future] and grants Being” (167). Yet, it difficult to understand how Heidegger’s appeal to this sort of quasi-mystical insight can constitute a serious resolution of the relativism problem. In fact, seeking divine revelation from Ereignis in this manner would seem to be just another way of introducing the “God of the philosophers”, which is a strategy that he thoroughly repudiates.              
^10	  In one of Cassirer’s very last works, he also advocates the continuing expansion of these geometrical concepts to other disciplines. Cassirer notes that psychologists are “not especially interested in mathematical speculation”, and that mathematicians do “not care about psychological problems”; yet, he insists that this “separation is of questionable value” (1979, 285). He continues: “Of course we cannot mix up the two fields of investigation; we must make a sharp distinction between the mathematical and psychological problem of space. But that ought not to prevent us from looking for a connecting link between the two problems; and I think that the concept of a group [of transformations] may be regarded as such a connecting link” (285).  
^11	  A recent interpretation of Husserl’s philosophy of space/geometry, which also utilizes the concept of transformation groups, can be found in Tieszen (2005, chapter 3). However, Tieszen does not take up the problematic issues pertaining to the life-world a priori, as disclosed in sections 3 and 4, which (as argued above) seem to pose an obstacle to the direct application of mathematics in reconstructing Husserl’s later philosophy; see, Tieszen (2005, chapter 1). See, also, Carr (1977), on the complexities of Husserl’s life-world. On Husserl’s earlier work on the foundations of mathematics, and its relevance for some of the issues discussed above, see, Hartimo (2006). 
^12	  On Deleuze and Guattari on chaos theory, see Sokal and Bricmont (1998). While controversial in their own right, these types of critiques of postmodern thought do shed light, at least tangentially, on an apparent trend among some contemporary theorists of lived-space; namely, the appropriation of mathematical and scientific terms or ideas, such that they are no longer used in their strictly technical sense, but rather are exploited to present an array of different meanings or notions (many possibly literary in origin).
^13	  The problem is that a non-metrical connection, such as an affine connection that preserves linearity but not length, does not guarantee a metrical connection, although the latter does contain the former. Deleuze and Guattari might think, erroneously, that the two concepts are necessarily and sufficiently conjoined, since they claim that “the two are linked and give each other impetus” (486). In trying to capture the alleged interdependence of smooth and striated spaces sought by Deleuze and Guattari, a better case from differential geometry might be found in the distinction between tangent vectors (or contravariant vectors) and 1-forms (or covariant vectors), which are inter-defined and equally necessary for the mathematical presentation (see, e.g., Burke 1980, chapter 2): the 1-forms, which provide the gradient for smooth functions, are often given the pictorial representation of a contour map, and thus its role in “numbering” the tangent vectors would nicely fit the category of striated space, while the tangent vectors obviously play the role of smooth space.
